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If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one
the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly
electing judges.'
[W]e do not have to put States to an all or nothing choice of
abandoning judicial elections or having elections in which anything
goes. 2
I. INTRODUCTION

The classic American statement in favor of an independent judiciary is
found in The FederalistNo. 78, in which Alexander Hamilton asserts the
importance of making the judicial branch "truly distinct from both the
legislature and the executive." 3 It would be unwise, says Hamilton, to
place the appointment power exclusively within the legislative or within
the executive branches because "there would be danger of an improper
complaisance [by the judicial branch] to the branch which possessed it."4
Less famously, Hamilton also asserts the wisdom of making the judiciary
independent of the popular will. He says that the cause of judicial
independence would be ill served if the power of selecting judges were
placed with the people, for then there would be "too great a disposition to
consult popularity."5 The selection of federal judges is therefore the joint
prerogative of the President and the Senate, with no role for popular
choice.6
But the American states have taken a different path. While following
the federal model during the first half century of American independence,
by the 1840s many states began selecting their judges through popular
elections. Thus,
every state entering the Union from 1846 to 1900 instituted popular
election of judges, and many existing states abandoned legislative
or executive appointment. Indeed, in the fourteen years after the
influential Iowa and New York constitutions of 1846 instituted
popular election ofjudges, twenty states moved from appointment
1. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
2. Id.at 799-800 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
3. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4. Id.at 471.
5. Id.
6. See U.S, CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
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to election for some or all of their judges; so that by 1861, twentyfour of the thirty-four states selected judges by election rather than
by appointment.
Today, approximately eighty percent of state trial and appellate court
judges are selected at least in part by either contested or retention election.8
But states have also chosen to structure judicial elections in a manner
aimed at reducing their political character. At least since 1924, when the
American Bar Association promulgated its first Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, judicial candidates have been subjected to considerable
restrictions on their ability to pronounce their opinions on controversial
issues of popular concern, or the actions they intend to take with respect
to those issues. Indeed, until the recent rise of highly contentious and
expensive judicial elections in a number of states, ajudicial campaign was
typically "a low budget affair where the judicial candidate spoke to any
group willing to hear a dull speech about improving the judiciary or about
judicial qualifications."9 The principle at work here is that allowing
judicial candidates to engage in freewheeling discussions of controversial
issues, and especially allowing them to make express or implied promises
as to how they will address these issues when deciding cases, clashes in
the most direct way with the idea of judicial impartiality.
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that one of the regulations with
which Minnesota limited the political character of itsjudicial elections was
unconstitutional. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a 5-4
majority of the Court found that prohibiting a judicial candidate from
"announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues" is a
violation of the First Amendment.' ° Although states are free to do away
with popular election as a means of judicial selection, this
greater power to dispense with elections altogether does not include
the lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of stateimposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses to tap the energy and
the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it must accord the

7. G.ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 122 (1998).
8. For a detailed breakdown ofjudicial selection methods state-by-state see The American
Judicature Society's website at www.ajs.org. See also JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: PAST, PRESENT,
FUTURE, available at www.manhattan-institute.org.
9. Anthony Champagne, Interest GroupsandJudicialElections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1391,
1393 (2001).
10. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
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participants in that process... the First Amendment rights that
attach to their roles.""
White's impact may extend well beyond the eight states with a canon
identical to Minnesota's "Announce Clause," which is based on a
provision of the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 2 As we shall
see, many consider White a landmark decision whose scope reaches a wide
range of rules regulating the conduct of elected judges and judicial
candidates, both during their election campaigns and while holding office.
This being the case, and given that no state currently holding judicial
elections is likely to do away with them in the near future, citizens and
officials concerned with both the appearance and reality of impartial state
judiciaries would be well served by a careful examination of White.
The following Article is divided into six sections: Section II is a broad
overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in White; Section III offers
a detailed analysis of the opinion; Section IV attempts to explain why the
opinion, and its underlying philosophy, are wrong; Section V is an
exposition of the stakes involved in White; Section VI reviews the legal
landscape following White; and Section VII proposes an alternative to the
canon invalidated in White.
II. EXPLAINING REPUBLICAN PARTY OFMINNESOTA V. WHITE
The canon invalidated in White prohibited a candidate for judicial
office from "announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues."' 3 The U.S. Supreme Court, following the Eighth Circuit, treated
the canon as a content-based regulation of speech warranting strict
constitutional scrutiny. 4 Both parties stipulated to this standard of
review. "
The content-based doctrine emerged in its clearest form during the
Vietnam war and the civil rights movement protests, where it came as a
response to mounting legislative efforts to silence these sources of social
unrest. The basic idea underlying the distinction was succinctly expressed
in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, where the Court stated that
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
11. Id. (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
12. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1972).
13. White, 536 U.S. at 775.
14. Id. at 774-75.
15. Id.
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or its content.""I6 Content-based regulations of speech define the category
of regulated speech by reference to the speech's content. Content-based
regulations include, inter alia, regulations burdening sexual speech,
regulations burdening speech describing criminal activity, and, in White,
regulations burdening speech dealing with "disputed legal or political
issues."' 7

In principle, content-based regulations are subjected to "strict
constitutional scrutiny," which meant that Minnesota's Board of Judicial
Standards had to show that the Announce Clause was "narrowly tailored,
to serve... a compelling state interest."' 8 In other words, the Board had
to show that Minnesota's canon advanced an important purpose, and that
that purpose could not "be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive" to the freedom of speech. 9
Minnesota's Board of Judicial Standards argued that the canon served
two compelling state interests: 1) the preservation ofthe impartiality ofthe
state judiciary, and 2) the preservation of the appearance of impartiality of
the state judiciary.2 ° In response, the Supreme Court asserted that although
the term "impartiality" was "used throughout the Eighth Circuit's opinion,
the briefs, the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, and the ABA Codes
of Judicial Conduct, none of these sources bothers to define it."'" The
Court then embarked on an exposition of the notion of judicial
impartiality, against which it examined the constitutionality of the
challenged clause. The Court's analysis followed several steps. First, the
Court proposed a definition of judicial impartiality; next, it examined
whether the Announce Clause served that type of impartiality, and whether
serving that impartiality was a "compelling state interest"; finally,
assuming the Announce Clause did serve that impartiality and serving that
impartiality was indeed a "compelling state interest," the Court examined
whether Minnesota's canon was "narrowly tailored" to serve it.

16. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
17. See White, 536 U.S. at 774; see also Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,

116(1991).
18. White, 536 U.S. at 774-75. One exception to this rule is the doctrine of "secondary
effects," which pertains to regulations of speech that burden speech by reference to its content but
are not aimed at suppressing speech. Rather, such regulations are aimed at some "secondary
effects" which accompany the communicative content but are not caused by it.
19. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).

20. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
21. Id. at 775.

.
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The opinion, written by Justice Scalia, proposed three different
definitions of judicial impartiality, none of which allowed the canon to
pass constitutional muster. Under the first definition the Announce Clause
was insufficiently narrowly tailored; under the second definition the
Announce Clause did not involve a "compelling state interest"; and the
third definition was simply not served by the Announce Clause.22

III.

THREE DEFINITIONS OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY

The Court's first proposed definition of impartiality pertained to the
"lack of bias for or against a party to a dispute." Here judicial impartiality
"guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to
him in the same way he applies it to any other party."23 But, said the Court,
if this is what Minnesota means by impartiality then the challenged clause
"is not narrowly tailored to serve impartiality.... Indeed, the clause is
barely tailored to serve that interest at all, inasmuch as it does not restrict
speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for or against
particular issues.'24
The second definition ofjudicial impartiality pertained to the "lack of
a bias for or against particular issues," or as the Court put it, the "lack of
preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view."25 But if this
is the sort of impartiality the Announce Clause means to protect, then the
canon fails strict scrutiny because preserving such impartiality is not a
compelling state interest:
For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find ajudge who does not
have preconceptions about the law. . . . [But] even if it were
possible to select judges who did not have preconceived views on
legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so .... And since
avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible
nor desirable, pretending otherwise by attempting to preserve the
"appearance" of that type of impartiality can hardly be a compelling
state interest either.26
The third definition of judicial impartiality pertained to "openmindedness": "This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no
22. Id. at 775-84.
23. Id. at 776.
24. Id.

25. White, 536 U.S. at 777 (emphasis omitted).
26. Id-
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preconceptions on legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views
that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the
issues arise in a pending case."27 However, the Court stated, "we do not
believe the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the announce clause for that
purpose.... [S]tatements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal
portion of the public commitments to legal positions that judges (or
judges-to-be) undertake, that this object of the prohibition is
implausible., 28 After all, people commit themselves to legal positions by
writing articles, giving lectures, participating in drafting legislation, or
simply deciding cases as sitting judges. The Court concluded:
The short of the matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate forjudicial
office may not say "I think it is constitutional for the legislature to
prohibit same-sex marriages." He may say the very same thing,
however, up until the very day before he declares himself a
candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pending)
after he is elected. As a means of pursuing the objective of openmindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is
so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a
challenge to the credulous.29
The philosophy underlying the opinion is essentially this: some states
choose to allow voters to select the bench. Yet, this canon of judicial
conduct (promulgated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, not by the
legislature) eviscerates that entire exercise. Citizens need information in
order to cast a meaningful vote, and the prohibition deprives them of much
of the information they may consider most important for their choice.30
Moreover, prohibiting judges from making controversial legal or political
announcements would not solve the fundamental problem with judicial
elections: namely, judges making determinations that are influenced by
popular opinion in violation of the duty of judicial impartiality. This
danger, as the Court points out, is certainly not eliminated by the
Announce Clause, since elected judges who make unpopular decisions
always stand the risk of being voted out of office. 3 They have the sword
27. Id. at 777-78.
28. Id. at 778-79.
29. Id. at 779-80.
30. "[T]he notion that the special context ofelectioneeringjustifies an abridgment ofthe right
to speak out on disputed issues sets our First Amendment jurisprudence on its head.... We have
never allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to
voters during an election." White, 536 U.S. at 781-82 (emphasis omitted).
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of popular opinion hanging over their necks whether or not they can make
controversial public announcements during their campaigns. The result is
a highly questionable benefit to judicial impartiality, but an unquestionable
detriment to the freedom of speech and the process of judicial elections.
IV. WHAT'S WRONG WITH REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V WHITE

The fundamental flaw in the White opinion is its overly simplistic
analysis of the notion of judicial impartiality. As an initial matter, the
Court's distinction between the lack of a bias for or against "a party" and
the lack of a bias for or against "a legal issue" is incomprehensible. A
judge who states that "malpractice liability is construed too narrowly"
expresses a bias regarding a certain legal issue, but also a bias for or
against certain parties - those suing and those sued for malpractice
liability. Similarly, a woman in a child custody battle standing before a
judge who declared in his election campaign that "men get too many raw
deals in custody rulings" would not be reassured by the thought that this
is "a bias against an issue."
Put differently, everything depends on the way in which one defines the
relevant party: the party may be Jane Doe, but Jane Doe may also be an
immigrant, a welfare recipient, an environmentalist, an anti-abortion
campaigner, a union organizer, a mother suing for custody, or a doctor
sued for malpractice. Controversial biases for or against parties and
controversial biases for or against legal issues are two sides of the same
coin.32 Thus there is little justification for the Court's assertion that the
Announce Clause "barely" serves to preserve the lack of a bias for or
against parties because the Clause "only restricts speech for or against
issues."33

31.
But elected judges - regardless of whether they have announced any views
beforehand - always face the pressure of an electorate who might disagree with
their rulings and therefore vote them off the bench. Surely the judge who frees
Timothy McVeigh places his job much more at risk than the judge who (horror of
horrors!) reconsiders his previously announced view on a disputed legal issue.
Id. at 782.
32. Justice Ginsburg cites in her dissenting opinion an Alabama Supreme Court case reversed
by the U.S. Supreme Court because one of the sittingjudges had a financial interest in the particular
legal resolution of the case. Id. at 814-15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)). Was this not a case of a bias against a party?
33. See id. at 776.
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The Court seemed to concede, in a footnote, that its analysis here is
oversimplified, saying "[slome of the speech prohibited by the announce
clause may well exhibit a bias against parties. '34 But, it quickly added,
"[t]he question under our strict scrutiny test, however, is not whether the
announce clause serves this interest [of preserving impartiality or
appearance of impartiality for or against parties] at all, but whether it is
narrowlytailoredto serve this interest. It is not. '35 This response is highly
unsatisfactory, for, as noted, it is hard to think of any bias for or against a
"disputed legal issue" that is not also a bias for or against possible parties
to a dispute.
This point underscores the difficulty with the Court's discussion of the
second definition of impartiality, where the Court asserted that, so far as
impartiality is conceived as the lack of a bias for or against disputed legal
issues, the state has no compelling interest in preserving it. 36 There is a
paradoxical air to the Court's discussion of this point. It begins by defining
judicial impartiality - clearly something to aspire for - as the absence
of a judge's disputed preconception regarding a particular legal issue. But
it then immediately proceeds to declare - with a certain iconoclastic flare
often found in Justice Scalia's opinions - that "avoiding judicial
preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable."37 There
is some welcomed realism in the recognition that legitimate judicial
determinations are often a function of controversial preconceptions, but
there is much clumsiness of thought in the consequent dismissal of the
entire concern over such preconceptions. After all, if such preconceptions
(say, a controversial preference for a narrow reading of manufacturers'
product liability) can also be seen as a bias for or against parties to a
dispute (the sued manufacturer, the suing consumer) then, by the Court's
own admission, some compelling state interest may be implicated here.
The Court, however, claimed that Minnesota's interest under this
definition of impartiality was either the elimination of judicial
preconceptions or the concealment of these preconceptions from the
public. 3' These suggestions are not serious: a more realistic hypothesis is
that Minnesota sought to curb the potentially harmful influence of election
campaigns upon judges' legal preconceptions. Indeed it is precisely the
34. Id.at 777 n.7.
35. White, 536 U.S. at 777 n.7 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 778.
37. Id.
38. "[S]ince avoidingjudicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable,
pretending otherwise by attempting to preserve the 'appearance' of that type of impartiality can
hardly be a compelling state interest either." Id.at 778.
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fact that such disputed preconceptions often play an indispensable role in
judicial determinations that makes attending to them a compelling state
interest.
The danger is obvious: officials running for office often adjust their
positions so as to align them with popular opinion with the aim of
increasing their chances of getting elected. This may cause several
problems which can be brought, for simplicity's sake, under two broad
categories ofjudicial duty: the faithful application of the law, and judicial
legislation.39 First,judges may adopt preconceptions which are popular but
entirely unreasonable given the established law. Opinions which
electioneering legislators are free to express and then to try to act upon
may be totally out of bounds for elected judges and a threat to their duties
of office. Judges who declare that "the Constitution not only allows the
banning of abortions: it requires it," or "I believe that the First Amendment
does not protect speech promoting radical Islam," or "I believe that
different evidentiary rules apply to accused child molesters than to other
defendants," may all be expressing popular opinions; but their declarations
are a challenge to the integrity of the legal system and a powerful incentive
to violate that integrity. Legislative candidates may make such
declarations and then try to make them a reality without violating their
duties of office; judges may not.
Secondly, as the Court put it, "state-court judges possess the power to
'make' common law" and "the immense power to shape the States'
constitutions."4 But even here, where the White philosophy appears at its
most justfied, the issue is far more complicated. After all, judges may
"legislate," but they are not legislators. In a typical legislature there are
dozens or even hundreds of representatives. This allows for a wide
representation and divergence of opinions, as well as for the political giveand-take of negotiated legislative compromises, which is so important in
cases where a minority of legislators feel more strongly about a subject
than an opposing majority. The judge, on the other hand, is often a sole
decision-maker, or at best a member of a very small panel, and is often
elected to much longer terms of office than the ordinary two or four years.
In such circumstances, politicized judicial elections may bring about rather
radical judicial "legislation." This is a problem that afflicts judicial
legislation in general; but it may become particularly virulent were judicial
elections turned into a freewheeling politicized affair resembling
legislative elections. Judges running on divisive political or legal platforms
39. Note that the following problems remain whether candidates amend their opinions in
accordance with popular opinion, or whether they agree with popular opinion to begin with.
40. White, 536 U.S. at 784.
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may put in place legal rules and doctrines that would never have passed a
proper legislative vote. For example, legislatures may fail to come to an
agreement about even minimal gun control regulations; but a judge
running on a gun control platform ("I believe that existing legal doctrine
allows the imposition of huge liabilities on gun manufacturers whose
weapons end up in the wrong hands and then cause injury or death") may
put in place legal doctrines which would amount to a tight regulation of
the industry. These doctrines may be perfectly legitimate "judicial
legislation" so far as existing doctrine is concerned, and in this case may
even appear laudable; but they may still constitute an unwanted revolution
in our constitutional separation of powers. Driven by highly politicized
campaigns, "judicial legislation" may become far more assertive for a
second reason: nonpolitical judges who see themselves as accountable to
the population at large, free of obligations to any political or ideological
sub-section, would tend to look for more centrist and widely acceptable
solutions. But judges who feel accountable to an ideologically or
politically well-defined group of voters would tend to make decisions of
a more polarizing nature.
The point is this: Minnesota's interest in judicial impartiality,
conceived as the lack of judicial preconceptions, need not consist of the
wish to eliminate those preconceptions, nor of the wish to hide them from
the public. It may consist of the wish to regulate the forces which may
mold and influence the legal preconceptions of judges, and the incentives
judges may have for adopting and acting upon these preconceptions. That
"avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor
desirable"' is only the beginning of the analysis, not its end.
The Court's inability to recognize the nuanced difficulties with judicial
impartiality also affects its treatment of the third and last proposed
definition. Here judicial impartiality is defined as open-mindedness, i.e.,
the judge's susceptibility to persuasion by the arguments put forth by the
parties.42 The Court claims that this sense of impartiality cannot be served
by the Announce Clause because the clause prohibits only a tiny fraction
of the possible public commitments to controversial legal or political
issues (commitments which may be made with impunity both before and
after election campaigns through law review articles, lectures, even
judicial opinions).43 But as both Justice Stevens' and Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinions point out, this claim fails to take note of the important
distinction between statements made in the course of an election campaign
41. Id. at 778.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 778-79.
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and statements made in law review articles or in judicial opinions.44
Election campaigns offer a particularly dangerous forum for the making
of public commitments. As an initial matter, most voters perk up their ears
for judicial candidates' declarations only during their election campaigns,
thereby creating a powerful incentive to cater to popular opinion, which
may hardly exist in different times or contexts. But election campaigns
also open a unique channel of communication between a candidate and the
voting public. It is essentially only there that the candidate comes before
the public and explicitly says: "This is why you should vote for me." Thus,
it is only there that the candidate assumes an obligation vis-a-vis the
public. A candidate expressing her opinion on controversial issues in a law
review article, a judicial opinion, or a public lecture does not assume such
an obligation. There is nothing here of the give-and-take with the voter
that is inherent to electoral campaign declarations articulating the
candidate's controversial legal or political views.
The Court responds to this point in two ways. First, it contends that it
"might be plausible" to claim that campaign speech poses a special threat
if it comes in the form of campaign promises. 45 However, a different
Minnesota canon prohibits campaigning judicial candidates from making
campaign promises, thereby removing this threat:46
44. "It is only by failing to recognize the distinction, clearly stated by then-Justice Rehnquist,
between statements made during a campaign or confirmation hearing and those made before
announcing one's candidacy, that the Court is able to conclude [that no compelling state interest
is involved here]." Id. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[One must] distinguish quite sharply between a public statement made prior to
nomination for the bench, on the one hand, and a public statement made by a
nominee to the bench. For the latter to express any but the most general
observation about the law would suggest that, in order to obtain favorable
consideration of his nomination, he deliberately was announcing in advance,
without benefit of judicial oath, briefs, or argument, how he would decide a
particular question that might come before him as ajudge.
Id.at 819 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836, n.5 (1972)
(memorandum opinion)).
45. White, 536 U.S. at 780.
46. This canon was adopted by a number of states. Before White, it was upheld in a number
of cases. See In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2001) (a candidate whose advertisement
said: "When Judge Spencer ran for judge of the Circuit Court, he promised to send more child
molesters to jail ... burglars to jail ...drug dealers to jail .... He's kept his promise. Let's keep
Judge Spencer."); In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1997) (ajudicial candidate who vowed to "stop
suspending sentences" and to "stop putting criminals on probation"); Summe v. Judicial Ret. &
Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Ky. 1997) (a candidate whose advertisement, which was
harshly critical of an incumbent's purported record of sentencing child abusers to probation,
concluded with an exhortation to elect a judge who "will let no one walk away before justice is
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A candidate who says "If elected, I will vote to uphold the
legislature's power to prohibit same-sex marriages" will positively
be breaking his word if he does not do so (although one would be
naYve not to recognize that campaign promises are - by long
democratic tradition - the least binding form of human
commitment). But, as noted earlier, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has adopted a separate prohibition on campaign "pledges or
promises," which is not challenged here.47
Second, the Court asserts that so far as nonpromissory statements are
concerned, there is no good reason to think that campaign speech poses
greater danger to judicial impartiality than many other forms of speech
which are perfectly allowed:
The proposition that judges feel significantly greater compulsion,
or appear to feel significantly greater compulsion, to maintain
consistency with nonpromissorystatements made during a judicial
campaign than with such statements made before or after the
campaign is not self-evidently true. It seems to us quite likely, in
fact, that in many cases the opposite is true. We doubt, for example,
that a mere statement of position enunciated during the pendency
of an election will be regarded by a judge as more binding - or as
more likely to subject him to popular disfavor if reconsidered than a carefully considered holding that the judge set forth in an
earlier opinion denying some individual's claim to justice.4
Since Minnesota failed to establish that campaign commitments "are
uniquely destructive of open-mindedness," and since campaign
commitments "are such an infinitesimal portion of the public commitments
to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be) undertake," the Court
concluded that the Announce Clause was not aimed at protecting openmindedness.
There are more obvious and less obvious flaws in this response. First,
as Justice Ginsburg points out, given the way with which the Court
conceptualizes the distinction between promissory and non-promissory
served."); In re Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422,425 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999) (a judicial candidate
who told voters that she "will be a tough Judge that [sic] supports the death penalty and isn't afraid
to use it.").
47. White, 536 U.S. at 780.
48. Id. at 780-81 (emphasis omitted).
49. Id. at 779, 781.
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statements, that distinction is vacuous.5 ° The Court seems to think that
campaign promises must be stated as explicit promises, so that a candidate
who says "I believe it is constitutional for the legislature to prohibit samesex marriages" is saying something fundamentally different than a
candidate who says "I will uphold the constitutionality of the legislature's
power to prohibit same-sex marriages." According to the Court, only the
latter is a campaign promise." This distinction is devoid of any practical
import. Candidates will simply formulate all their campaign pledges in
non-promissory language. So the canon prohibiting campaign promises,
at least in the way the White opinion appears to envision its operation, does
nothing to alleviate our special concern with campaign speech.
Secondly, the Court's assertion that judges would not feel greater
compulsion to respect nonpromissory campaign statements than they
would other public statements they make (for instance in law review
articles) is both wrong and beside the point. In a campaign speech the
candidate essentially says: "you should vote for me because this is what
I think about this matter." Judges may prove unfaithful to any publicly
50. See id. at 819-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[T]he ban on pledges or promises is easily circumvented. By prefacing a campaign
commitment with the caveat, "although I cannot promise anything," or by simply
avoiding the language of promises or pledges altogether, a candidate could declare
with impunity how she would decide specific issues. Semantic sanitizing of the
candidate's commitment would not, however, diminish its pernicious effects on
actual and perceived judicial impartiality. To use the Court's example, a candidate
who campaigns by saying, "If elected, I will vote to uphold the legislature's power
to prohibit same-sex marriages," (citation omitted) will feel scarcely more
pressure to honor that statement than the candidate who stands behind a podium
and tells a throng of cheering supporters: "I think it is constitutional for the
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages." (citation omitted). Made during a
campaign both statements contemplate a quid pro quo between candidate and
voter.
Id.at 819-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 779-80.
In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office may not say "I think it is
constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages." He may say the
very same thing, however, up until the very day before he declares himself a
candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pending) after he is elected.
Id. So according to the Court, such a declaration is protected by the Constitution. And since the
Court also asserts that the prohibition against campaign promises may well be constitutional, the
obvious implication is that this declaration is not a promise in the eye of the Court. Id.
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taken position. Yet a judge facing the choice of faithfulness to her
campaign statements is bound not only by her wish to save face or to
appear consistent - that is, not only by a wish to protect her reputation but also by an elected official's duty to the people who voted for her. This
certainly does create a "greater compulsion" so far as judicial decisionmaking is concerned. 2
But even if campaign statements create no greater obligation than a law
review article, campaign speech still retains its unique dangers. Once
campaigning judicial candidates are free to express their controversial
legal and political positions, these positions are bound to become the pivot
ofjudicial election campaigns. Indeed, no candidate could afford to remain
silent on issues upon which his opponent had expressed herself: such
silence would court retaliation from both sides to the dispute. This
phenomenon is easily seen in any legislative or executive campaign. The
result would be a series of commitments regarding controversial public
issues which may not have even existed otherwise. Thus there would be
"greater compulsion" at least so far as there would be many more
commitments made by campaigning judges.
The truth of the matter is this: the White opinion is a badly reasoned
and highly diffident opinion. The number of references to the convincing
dissents is quite astonishing. The opinion draws meaningless distinctions,
ignores meaningful ones, and offers an analysis ofjudicial impartiality that
is oversimplified to the point of irrelevance. The entire opinion appears to
be based on the rather limited idea that prohibiting judicial candidates
from expressing their controversial political views is inimical to the very
essence of free elections.53 But legislative elections and judicial elections
52. See White, 536 U.S. at 781.
53. Id. at 782.
We have never allowed the government to prohibit cjndidates from
communicating relevant information to voters during an election. Justice Ginsburg
would do so - and much of her dissent confirms rather than refutes our
conclusion that the purpose behind the announce clause is not openmindedness in
the judiciary, but the undermining ofjudicial elections.
Id. In fact, what Justice Ginsburg actually says is that judicial candidates' controversial political
views are irrelevant to their qualifications for office, and she seeks to demonstrate this point by
pointing out that all sitting judges on the Supreme Court have refused to answer questions about
their controversial political views during their confirmation hearings in the Senate. Id. at 807 n. 1,
819 n.4. The Court responds to this charge by missing, once again, the entire point: "Nor do we
assert that candidates for judicial office should be compelled to announce their views on disputed
legal issues. Thus, Justice Ginsburg's repeated invocation of instances in which nominees to this
Court declined to announce such views during Senate confirmation hearings is pointless." Id.at 783
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are not the same thing. In legislative elections the candidate's controversial
political views are indeed the crux of the matter; in judicial elections they
are not and should not be. The public recognizes this truism. In an
extensive national survey of public attitudes toward state courts, seventysix percent of respondents said that judges should be elected. 4 When
asked which of the following statements came closer to their own view: (1)
"Courts are unique institutions of government that should be free of
political and public pressure"; or (2) "Courts are just like other institutions
of government and should not be free of political and public pressure,"
seventy-eight percent chose the first statement." These citizens understand
a simple truth that eludes five justices of the Supreme Court: we may
choose to elect rather than appoint judges for reasons having nothing to do
with determining the political ideologies of sitting judges, or their
acquiescence to popular public opinion. Judicial elections seek to
guarantee the integrity, competency, and diversity of the bench, and these
qualities are independent of the ideologies or the politics of the elected
judges.
V. WHAT IS AT STAKE?

What is at stake in White is the very character of our legal culture.
Highly politicized judicial elections, where judges campaign and get
elected by reference to their controversial ideological agendas, would
obligate and empower judges to inject these ideologies into their judicial
decisions. Where judges are positioned vis-i-vis the public as ideally
neutral adjudicators standing above the fray of day-to-day political and
social disputes, their role is very different than the role of a judge who
occupies the bench solely by virtue of her legal or political views on a
range of controversial social issues. It is of course true that ideological or
political preferences play a role in proper judicial decision-making; but
that role is highly circumscribed in proper judicial practice. Judicial
interpretation must follow a certain "form" which greatly constrains the
occasions and the impact of ideological or political preferences onjudicial
decision-making.
I said before that the problem with politicized judicial campaigns can
be analyzed in regard to the faithful application of the law and in regard
n. 11.What Ginsburg claims is that such opinions are irrelevant to one's qualification for judicial
office - whether one announces them voluntarily or not.
54 Justice at Stake: Frequency Questionnaire,FAIRCOURTS.ORG 7 (2001), available at
http://www.faircourts.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
55. Id.
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to judicial legislation; but this statement was something of an
oversimplification. It may be heuristically helpful to draw a distinction
between following predetermined legal rules and between writing new
rules, but such a distinction does not exist in actual judicial practice. Every
statute, however seemingly applicable, must still be adjudged suitable for
the given case before it is applied, while every judicially made rule is
highly constrained by the legal materials surrounding the case. Judges
never just follow predetermined rules, and they never blaze trails in
uncharted territory. Proper adjudication does not obey legislation and
precedent; it respects it. Thus, perhaps in contradiction with the idea
prevailing in the popular mind, judges never simply follow rules which
define in advance the conditions for their own applicability: those
conditions may be present where a legal rule is inapplicable, or absent
where it is. Yet legal decision-making is never like the decision-making
of a legislator who decides, all things considered, on the best course of
action.
This is not the place for a detailed elaboration of the constraints of legal
interpretation and the special form of the legal discourse.56 But, it should
not come as a surprise to anyone that these constraints incorporate a
distinction between legal resolutions which are merely disagreeable and
legal resolutions which are unreasonable. In other words, the distinction
is between resolutions that a judge dislikes but is obligated to accept and
resolutions that a judge dislikes and must not allow. Judges must
constantly make such distinctions, and in making them they are never
wholly non-ideological: they always have their potentially controversial
opinions with which they identify what is or is not a reasonable course of
action. But neither are they wholly ideological: judges are often compelled
to make decisions which conflict with their preferred ideology. Proper
adjudication encompasses a commitment to a perspective that is not totally
"neutral," but is not partisan either.
White is a threat to this perspective. Politicized judicial elections will
produce judges who are bound to give less credence to opposing
ideologies and more credence to their own. After all, ajudge elected on a
controversial ideological platform presumably has the public duty to
advance that platform. Judges elected by nonpolitical campaigns are bound
to have a more inclusive view of reasonable and unreasonable courses of
action than judges who occupy the bench by virtue of their controversial
56. Such an elaboration can be found, among other places, in chapter 6 of my book Judicial
Impartialityand Modern Legal Theory. See generally OFER RABAN, JUDIcIAL IMPARTIALIrY AND
MODERN LEGAL THEORY (2003).
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political views. What is at stake in White are the fundamental principles of
our judicial culture.
VI. JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS AFTER REPUBLICAN PARTY OF
MINNESOTA V. WHITE

Some courts have been unwilling to follow the logic of White," while
others have enthusiastically embraced it." Some of those courts have
begun dismantling the existing regulation ofjudicial campaigns, and even
the regulation of judges' conduct in office. In Weaver v. Bonner,59 the
Eleventh Circuit, relying on White, struck down a canon of the Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct providing that candidates forjudicial office shall
not use any any statement which the candidate "knows or reasonably
should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains
a material misrepresentation of fact or law... ."' The opinion stated: "we
believe that the Supreme Court's decision in White suggests that the
standard for judicial elections should be the same as the standard for
legislative and executive elections."'" In Smith v. Phillips,62 the U.S.
District Court of the Western District of Texas declared unconstitutional
a canon prohibiting judges, as well as judicial candidates, from making
statements
that indicate an opinion on any issue that may be subject to judicial
interpretation by the office which is being sought or held, except
that discussion of an individuals' [sic] judicial philosophy is
appropriate if conducted in a manner which does not suggest to a
reasonable person a probable decision on any particular case.63

57. See generally White, 536 U.S. at 768-88; see, e.g., In re William Watson, 100 N.Y.2d
290, 296, 299 (N.Y. 2003) (a judicial candidate whose election campaign declared that "[wie are
in desperate need of a [judge who will work with the police, not against them. We need ajudge
who will assist our law enforcement" violated New York canons of judicial conduct) (emphasis
omitted); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 79-80 (Fla. 2003) (a judicial candidate whose election
campaign declared that "judges must support hard working law enforcement officers by putting
criminals behind bars, not back on our streets" violated Florida's canons of judicial conduct).
58. See, e.g., Christian Coalition v. Cole, 355 F.3d 1288 (11 th Cir. 2004).
59. See generally Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2002).
60. See id.; GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(B)(1)(d) (1994).
61. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
62. See Smith v. Phillips, 2002 WL 1870038 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
63. Id. at * 1; see also TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(l) (2002).
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In Spargo v. N. Y. State Commission on JudicialConduct, a U.S. District
Court examined the constitutionality of four New York rules of judicial
conduct which required judges to act impartially and avoid partisan
political activities.64 The district court concluded that all four were facially
unconstitutional under White.65
66
In Griffen v. ArkansasJudicialDisciplineandDisabilityCommission,
the Arkansas Supreme Court invalidated the application of a canon which
held that "[a] judge shall not appear at a public hearing before, or
otherwise consult with, an executive or legislative body or official except
on matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration of
justice., 67 The judge in question called on Arkansas legislators to engage
in economic retaliation against the University of Arkansas following
accusations that a coach at the University had been fired because of his
race. 68 The court's First Amendment analysis began with the statement:
"With its decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the U.S.
Supreme Court changed the landscape for judicial ethics, at least with
respect to political campaigns., 69 A furious dissent responded:
In the not-too-distant future, it appears almost certain that the
United States Supreme Court will render a decision which will
effectively eviscerate any state government system that now
provides for the election of judges. See Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White . . . (citations omitted). It is a chilling and
sickening thought that the majority of the Supreme Court will, all
in the name of free speech, countenance and empower elected
judges to take their strong personal biases and use the authority of
the judgeship to render decisions based on personal beliefs,
64. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.1, which directsjudges to maintain "high standards ofconduct" and
to preserve "the integrity and independence of the judiciary"; § 100.2(A), which instructs judges
to avoid the appearance of impropriety by "act[ing] at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary"; and sections l00.5(A)(l)(c)-(g) and
100.5(A)(4)(a), which prohibit incumbent judges and judicial candidates from engaging in partisan
political activities that are unrelated to their own campaign for judicial office, and which require
all judicial candidates to "maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office."
65. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
This decision has been recently reversed by the Second Circuit on grounds that the district court
improperly exercised jurisdiction over the case since the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their state
remedies. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 81 (2d Cir. 2003).
66. Griffen v. Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm'n, No. 03-662, 2003 WL 22725673

(Ark. Nov. 20, 2003).
67. See ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4C(1) (2003).
68. Griffen, 2003 WL 22725673, at *2.
69. Id. at *9.
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irrespective of how the law should or does read.... As long as the
Supreme Court majority holds on to such fallacious thoughts and
ideas as those expressed by Justice O'Connor above, it is likely that
Court's majority will soon author an opinion which will make
judges political in all respects.""0
Some courts did not bother waiting. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has recently amended Canon 7(B) of North Carolina's Judicial Conduct so
as to allow judges to "attend, preside over, and speak at any political party
gathering."'"
Griffen' s blistering dissent is no overreaction. Constitutional or not, the
fact remains that the Announce Clause applied only to judicial candidates.
Butjudicial candidates are by no means the only parties that communicate
with the voters during judicial elections; political parties and interest
groups habitually do so. And whatever restrictions upon the First
Amendment rights of judicial candidates the courts will allow, there are
virtually no restrictions upon what others are allowed to say in elections,
evenjudicial elections. Indeed, when states tried to ensure that nonpartisan
elections will remain thoroughly nonpartisan by forbidding political
parties from endorsing candidates, some courts have found these
regulations to be inconsistent with the First Amendment.72 States may
possibly forbid judicial candidates from accepting the endorsement of a
political party, or from announcing their membership in a party, but they
cannot forbid these parties, or any other organizations or individual, from
speaking. 73 All this means that restricting judicial candidates' own speech
70. Id. at *15 (Glaze, J., dissentingjoinedbyCorbin & Hannah, J.J.).
71. See North Carolina Court System website, available at http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/
www/public/aoc/NCJudicialCode.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
72. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Lungren, 919 F. Supp. 1397, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1996);

Concerned Democrats of Fla. v. Reno, 458 F. Supp. 60, 64-65 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
73. White did not review the U.S. Court of Appeals' upholding of such prohibitions.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 886 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. grantedin part, 122
S. Ct. 643 (2001). The Court of Appeals held that it was wholly proper "to prevent judicial
candidates from incurring, or seeming to incur, debts to political parties that could compromise
their independence," and it stated that "because political parties have comprehensive platforms,
obligation to a party has a great likelihood of compromising a judge's independence on a wide
array of issues." Id. at 872, 876. It has been argued that nonpartisan elections are unwise because,
given pervasive voter ignorance in regards to judicial elections, not allowing judicial candidates

to associate themselves with a political party and its platform leaves interest groups with too great
a capacity to praise or demean judicial candidates without challenge. That is, nonpartisan elections
"may produce situations in which judges are particularly vulnerable to electoral challenges based
on narrow issues that arouse particular interest groups rather than the broad quality of their
performance on the bench." Charles H. Franklin, Behavioral Factors Affecting Judicial
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is ofthe utmost importance for keeping judicial campaigns from becoming
full-fledged partisan political affairs; and it also means that the right of the
public to be informed of its candidates is not as restricted as the White
opinion implied. Absent such restrictions, judicial campaigns are poised
to deteriorate into highly politicized contests destined to change the culture
of the judicial office, and with it the existing relations of power between
the different branches of government. Judges elected on divisive political
platforms are bound to perceive their roles, and perhaps justifiably so,
quite differently than judges running socially or politically neutral
campaigns. In short, a constitutionally valid regulation that would replace
the canon invalidated in White is essential for maintaining the very
possibility of judicial impartiality, and certainly its appearance.

VII. SUBSTITUTING THE ANNOUNCE CLAUSE

Minnesota's Announce Clause was declared unconstitutional for the
wrong reasons, but it did suffer from some serious constitutional
weaknesses. For one thing, it was a content-based regulation of speech.
This meant that the Clause had to be subjected to a constitutional strict
scrutiny. But there was little reason to appeal to the legal or political
content of the speech: the problem with the sort of campaign declarations
the Announce Clause prohibited is that they purport to take sides on cases
that might come before the court. Thus, there was no point in insisting that
these issues be political or legal since the relevant statement could engage
any subject matter. An alternative to the Announce Clause which avoids
this content-based classification was offered by the ABA's Model Code of
Judicial Conduct in 1990. The ABA's revised canon prohibits judicial
candidates from making "statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court."'74 This content-neutral formulation means that the
Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 152 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
Friedman eds., 2002).
74. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000). It may be worth
noting that, in response to the claim by Minnesota (in its attempt to defend the Announce Clause)
that the Announce Clause and this 1990 canon were identical, the Court said:
This argument is somewhat curious because, based on the same constitutional
concerns that had motivated the ABA, the Minnesota Supreme Court was urged
to replace the announce clause with the new ABA language, but, unlike other
jurisdictions, declined.... We do not know whether the announce clause (as
interpreted by state authorities) and the 1990 ABA canon are one and the same.
No aspect of our constitutional analysis turns on this question.
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new canon may not be subjected to strict scrutiny. Yet, admittedly, the
chances for this are not very high. Several Supreme Court cases have
identified the sort of speech that the ABA Canon restricts as a "central
concern[] in our First Amendment jurisprudence":" "Whatever differences
may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."76
Still, the new canon has other advantages over the invalidated
Announce Clause which may allow it to pass a constitutional scrutiny. For
one thing, the canon refers more or less directly to the interest it seeks to
protect: unlike the Announce Clause, it does not simply prohibit certain
forms of speech but instead prohibits "commitments with respect to
cases." This explicitness makes the state interest underlying the regulation
clear, thereby making it less susceptible to the wrong attribution of interest
found in White. 7 Referring directly to the "commitments" of candidates
also sits well with the Court's admission that campaign "pledges" or
"promises" (i.e. "commitments") may indeed pose a special threat to
judicial impartiality.
One unnecessary danger here is the canon's reference to "issues likely
to come before a court." There is no need to prohibit candidates'
commitments with respect to "issues" so long as commitments "with
respect to cases or controversies" are covered. Indeed, the reference to the
vaguer term "issues," rather than to the more concrete "cases and
controversies," may be read as an extension of the canon's reach bringing
it dangerously close to what the Supreme Court considered an illegitimate
concern with impartiality. (As we saw above, the Court refused to
recognize judges' commitments in regards to "issues" as involving a
compelling state interest.) Whatever the merit of the Court's position, it
would be wise to simply eliminate the reference to "issues." Nothing
important will be lost.
A different danger is that White's apparent construal of the "pledges
and promises" clause as pertaining only to explicit promises would drain
any significance out of this canon as well. Thus candidates who simply
frame all their commitments in nonpromissory terms ("I believe that gun
manufacturers have tortious liability for injuries caused by illegally owned
guns") may be able to avoid the canon's operation. The canon must
therefore be amended so as to explicitly include all those nonpromissory
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773 n.5 (2002).
75. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992).
76. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
77. See infra, Part Ill.
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campaign statements which are, for all intents and purposes,
"commitments with respect to cases or controversies." The most obvious
way of effecting the change is to build this concern straight into the canon:
the canon can prohibit judicial candidates from making "statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to the resolution
of cases or controversies that are likely to come before the court, whether
or not they appearin the form of explicitpromises."
Admittedly, the resulting formulation of this canon is not airtight. It is
not entirely clear what nonpromissory declarations count as commitments
and what do not. But this can only be decided in concrete fact situations.
It seems rather clear, for example, that the statement "I am a staunch
conservative who believes in strong family values" is too general to
commit its speaker to any side in a case or a controversy. The decision by
New York's highest court that ajudicial candidate's self-description as the
"law and order candidate" did not violate the state's ban on promissory
statements is in line with this understanding, because the statement does
not appear to commit the candidate to any specific side in a possible
controversy.78 On the other hand, statements like, "I believe that marital
infidelity is an indication of unsuitability for child custody," or, "I believe
that no man accused of child abuse should be out on bail," are clear
commitments despite their nonpromissory formulations. What lies in
between is more indeterminate, but indeterminacy, for better or worse, is
the share of many regulations.
One can hardly overestimate the importance of a canon which would
seek to do, in a constitutionally permissible manner, what the Announce
Clause sought to do in an impermissible way. Some "disputed legal or
political" statements by judicial candidates should certainly be permitted,
but many should not.
Some version of the ABA's proposed substitution of the Announce
Clause is one reasonable candidate for this important job. There is little
doubt that the new canon is an improvement over the Announce Clause so
far as constitutional doctrine is concerned, and the canon can be improved
even further in light of the White opinion. In any case, a constitutional
invalidation of this new canon would appear rather preposterous: the
canon, unlike its deceased predecessor, prohibits speech which directly
threatens an uncontroversial duty of judicial practice - the duty to reach
a legal conclusion only after hearing and considering the arguments put
forth by both parties to a dispute.

78. In re Shanley, 93 N.Y.2d 310, 312 (2002).
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The philosophy underlying the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White is straightforward: we all know
(at least those of us who are familiar with legal practice and are honest
about it) that controversial ideologies often play a decisive role in judicial
determinations. From this there seems to be but a small step to the
conclusion that judicial elections are aimed, in large part, at allowing the
public to determine those ideologies. Thus, the Announce Clause
obstructed voters from effecting the very purpose of judicial elections.
This reasoning, as believable as it may appear on first blush, is a
serious oversimplification ofthe issues involved. Controversial ideologies
enterjudicial determinations through a highly constrained decision-making
process, where they play a role much more subtle than the role they play
in legislative or executive determinations. The Announce Clause, far from
obstructing the purpose of judicial elections, was aimed at enabling such
elections to proceed without corrupting the judicial decision-making
process. Allowing judicial elections to become full-fledged political affairs
would not simply result in the public determining those ideologies which
influence judicial determinations; it would result, among other things, in
an unwanted revolution in the manner in which judges make these
determinations. This Article has sought to demonstrate why this is so, and
to call for the preservation of some regulation aimed at preventing such
eventuality.

